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Because it is my belief that the majority opinion interprets
the 1947 amendment to section 980 of the Civil Code so nar~
rowly as to provide no protection whatever to the products
of an .author's creative mind and because there is inherent
therein too strict a test f0r determining the issue of similarity
between the two productions, I would reverse the entire judgment with directions to the trial court to overrule the demurrers and permit the defendants to answer if they· be so
advised.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied May 28,
1953. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should
be granted.

[L. A. No. 22094. Iu Bank.

~Apr.

29, 1953.]

.ARTHUR KURLAJ\r, Appellant, v. COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC., (a Corporation) et al., Respondents.
[la, lb] J;.itera,ry :Property~Pleading.-A count .·of a complaint
whi.ch alleges that plaintiff submitted his radio program to
defendants at their special instance and request pursuant to
an express oral agreement that, if they used all or .any part
of the program, they would pay him its reasonable. value, and
that defendants accepted submission of the program script
and recording, became. fully familiar with it, and thereafter,
without plaintifl;'s authority or license, produced and broadcast
over a .coast-to-coast network a weekly series o£ programs
which substantially copied, used and embodied his radio program and format to his damage, states. a cause of action, and
a judgment for defendants entered on an order sustaining
their demurrers without leave to amend will be reversed with
directiQn$ to permit defendant$ to answer.
[2a, 2b] Id.;__Pleading....,:.;.A count of a complaint which allege!l
that plaintiff submitted his radio program .idea and !lampie audition recording to defendants at their request .for
the purpose of sale to or use by them on .payment to him
of its reasonable value, and that thereafter they, without plain·
tiff's ·license or authority, broadca!lt a weekly series of progr&m!l whi<lh sub!ltantially copied. and used his radio program
. [lJ See. Oal.Ju.r ., Literary Property; Am..Tur., Literary Property
and Copyright, § 112.
·
McK. Dig. Reference: [1-4} Literary Property.
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and format to his damage, stateR a cause of action on an implied eontract, and a judgment for defendants entered on an
order sustaining their demurrers without leave to amend will
be reversed with direetions to permit defendants to answer.
[3a, 3b] Id.-Pleading.-A count of a complaint which alleges that
plaintiff submitted his radio program idea and sample audition to defendants at their request pursuant to an implied
agreement that, if used by them, they would pay the reasonable value of the program idea or any part of it, and that
thereafter they, without plaintiff's authority or license, broadcast a weekly series of programs which substantially copied
and used his radio program and format to his damage, states
a cause of action on an implied contract, and a judgment for
defendants entered on an order sustaining their demurrers
without leave to amend will be reversed with directions to
permit defendants to answer.
[4a, 4b] Id.-Pleading.-A count of a complaint which alleges
that plaintiff submitted his radio program idea and sample
audition to defendant::~ at their request pursuant to trade customs, practices and usages, and that these customs are that
defendants would not use or copy all or any part of his program without his consent and that they would not do or permit any act in derogation of its value, but that thereafter they,
without plaintiff's license or authority, broadcast a weekly
series of programs which substantially copied and used his
radio program and format to his damage, states a cause of
action on an implied contract, and a judgment for defendants
entered on an order sustaining their demurrers without leave
to amend will be reversed with directions to permit defendants to answer.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Allen W. Ashburn, Judge. Reversed with
directions.
Action for damages for copying and using a proposed radio
program owned by plaintiff. Judgment for defendants on
sustaining demurrers to complaint without leave to amend,
reversed with directions to permit defendants to answer.
Fendler, Weber & Lerner, Harold A. Fendler and Daniel
A. Weber for Appellant.
Aubrey I. Finn, Pacht, Tannenbaum & Ross, Clore Warne,
Gordon Stulberg and Maxwell E. Greenberg, as Amici Curiae
on behalf of Appellant.
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0 'JVIelveny & Myers, Homer I. Mitchell, W. B. Carman
and Harned Pettus Hoose for Respondents.
'!'helen, Marrin, ,Johnson & Bridges, Loeb & Loeb, Herman F. Selvin and Harry !1. Gershon, as Amici Curiae on
behalf of Respondents.
EDMONDS, ;J.-Arthur Kurian is f-luing Columbia Broadeasting System, Inc., and others for damages upon the ground
that they copied and used a proposed radio program owned
by him. As in W eitzenkor·n v. Lesser, ante, p. 778 [256
P.2d 947 J, the appeal is from a judgment entered upon an
order sustaining the demurrers of the defendants without
leave to amend.
[la] For his first cause of action, Kurlan alleges that Ruth
MeKenney "originated, created and wrote certain stories for
the 'New Yorker Magazine' which were subsequently dramatized in a stage play entitled 'MY SrsTER EILEEN,' and which
were subsequently used as the basis of a motion picture photoplay also entitled 'MY SrsTER EILEEN' featuring the same
leading female characters known as 'Ruth' and 'Eileen,' and
depicting unique characterizations and relationships between
said characters.'' He states that, by written agreement, McKenney transferred to him "the sole and exclusive right to
use for radio broadcasting purposes said leading female
characters.'' She also assigned to him ''all radio broadcasting rights" which she had "expressly reserved" in connection with prior licenses and uses of these characters. A
further allegation is that, prior to the commencement of
this action, McKenney assigned to him all causes of action
which she might have against these defendants arising out
of transactions alleged in this complaint.
K urlan then pleads that he "conceived, originated, and
devised a new and original radio program idea and original
untitled radio program'' featuring Ruth and Eileen. In
eonnection with this program, he states, he originated new
program techniques and methods of radio presentation, including a new radio production format. These, he says. he
"reduced to concrete form and embodied" in a written script
and a sample audition recording, at a cost of $10,000, retaining at all times his common law rights of ownership and
authorship.
Kurian states that he submitted his radio program to the
defendants at their special instance and request pursuant to
40 C.2d-26

802

KuRLAN v. CoLUMBIA BRoADCASTING SYSTEM [ 40 C.2d

an express oral agreement. In consideration of such submission, if they used all or any part of the program they
promised to pay him its reasonable value. The defendants accepted submission of the program script and recording, he
states, heard it, and became fully familiar with it. Thereafter, CBS and the other clefen<lants, without Kurian's authority or license, pro<luced and broadcast over a coast-to--coast
network a weekly series of radio programs entitled, "My
:B~rien<l Irma.'' This radio broadcast, the complaint continues,
substantially copied, used and embodied his radio program
idea an<l format. Kurian claims general damages of $150,000
for rendering valueless his "personal property."
[2a] The second count uf the complaint incorporates by
reference all of the allegations of the first one except the averments with respect to an express agreement. In addition, it
declares that Kurlan submitted his radio program idea and
sample audition recording to the defendants at their request
for the purpose of sale to or use by them upon payment to
him of its reasonable value.
[3a] The third count also incorporates by reference all of
the allegations of the first one except the averments with respect
to an express agreement. It then alleges that Kurian submitted his radio program idea and audition recording to the
defendants at their request pursuant to an implied agreement that, in consideration for the submission, if used by
them, they would pay him the reasonable value of the program
idea, or any part of it.
[4a] After incorporating by reference all of the allegations
of the first count except those with respect to an express
agreement, the fourth count asserts that the radio program
was submitted to the defendants at their request pursuant
to trade customs, practices and usages. These customs, the
complaint declares, are that the defendants would not use
or copy all or any part of his program without his consent
and that they would not do or permit any act in derogation of
its value.
By reference, all of the allegations of the first count, except
those respecting an express agreement, use of the program
by the defendants and damages, are made a part of the fifth
one. Kurian then pleads that he submitted his program to the
defendants at their request for the purpose of sale to them.
They heard the audition recording, he says, and retained it in
their possession for several weeks, becoming fully familiar
with its contents.
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'fhereafter, according to the complaint, the defendants
negotiated with him for production of a series of radio
programs based upon his idea. These negotiations, Kurian
states, were terminated when the defendants informed him
that they ''intended to use'' his idea, characters and format
''without compensation therefor by merely changing the names
of the characters and describing the leading female characters
as girl friends instead of sisters.'' According to Kurian, the
defendants said that by doing so they would save the expense
of compensating him and McKenney and own and control
the program. Kurian alleges that he immediately objected
to the proposed action and notified the defendants that they
would act at their peril.
Thereafter, Kurian states, with full notice and knowledge
of his rights and ''in wilful and deliberate disregard thereof,''
the defendants broadcast over a coast-to-coast network a
weekly series of radio programs entitled, "My Friend Irma."
These programs substantially copied, used, embodied and misappropriated his "untitled and unpublished sample audition
recording.'' By such conduct, Kurian says, the defendants
"have appropriated the rights, benefits, royalties and profits
to which" he "is solely and exclusively entitled," and they
have destroyed the value of his "personal property." He
alleges general damages in the amount of $150,000.
The fifth count includes an allegation that, because of their
nature, "it is not practicable to attach to the complaint"
either Kurian's audition recording or recordings of the defendants' radio program. The defendants' recordings are
in their possession and control, it is said. Kurian makes
profert of his recording and consents that the records which
be submitted to the defendants ''shall be deemed to be a part
of this complaint for all purposes and upon any demurrer,
motion or other proceeding in this cause.'' By stipulation,
this allegation was made a part of each of the preceding counts
of the complaint.
The defendants demurred to the complaint upon the grounds
that each count fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action. They also moved to require Kurian to comply
with section 426 (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The motion to require compliance with the statute was
granted and the records of both radio programs were ordered
to be introduced and filed as exhibits on demurrer. Thereafter, demurrers were sustained without leave to amend and
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judgment entered ''that plaintiff take nothing as against said
defendants.''
This court has studied the scripts and heard recordings of
both radio programs. Kurian's program, "My Sister Eileen,"
features ''the further adventures of Ruth and Eileen,'' the
principal characters ''from Ruth McKenney's best-selling
stories and from the Broadway and motion picture hit'' of
the same name. The principal idea of the program is to
capitalize upon the success of McKenney's creation. As stated
in an advertising blurb in the audition script, "Millions of
people have read the Ruth and Eileen stories or seen the play
or picture . . . which means that several million dollars worth
of some one else's money has already been spent for you,
Mr. Prospective Client . . . . These characters have been highly
successful in every medium-magazines-books-stage-and
screen . . . but-as a series have never before been presented
on the air . . . the medium for which they are best suited."
The program may be summarized as follows : Ruth and
Eileen are sisters living in an apartment which Eileen found
for them in New York City. Ruth possesses average intelligence and capabilities and is the balance wheel of the pair.
Eileen is semi-moronic, scatterbrained, impulsive, naive, completely thoughtless and oblivious to the consequences of most
of her acts. Lucille Ball, a motion picture actress under contract to Kurlan, plays the part of Ruth.
Ruth, as narrator, introduces a series of incidents in which
Eileen's stupidity creates situations extremely embarrassing
to Ruth. Ruth is constantly trying to rescue one or both of
them from Eileen's scrapes, while Eileen continues to add complications. Through Ruth's efforts, Eileen's situations are
turned to the benefit of the pair.
Most of the situations which Eileen creates arise, directly
or indirectly, from the fact that Eileen is man-crazy. She
trnsh; any man, and has an astonishing capacity for acquiring
large numbers of them in unorthodox ways. This trait introduces certain minor characters into the program, including
one dispossessed male who moves in to live with the girls.
There is a loud-mouthed Texan boor who, thanks to Eileen,
forces his crude attentions upon Ruth. Among other characters an; an ec·eentrie old landlady and an ill-tempered canine
monstrosit.v. Rnth 's bo.v friend, TJ!oyd Carter, is mentioned
in the audition reeording but his personality is not developed.
The defendants' program, "My Friend Irma," also features
two girls, one reasonably intelligent, the other stupid, living
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in an apar/.m(mt iu NPw Yoek City. HowevPr, it in 110 way
attempts to eapit.alizP npon HH~ f-:twer.ss of Md\enney's creation. ,Janc and Irma arn ehan<·e hieJl(lR, not sisters. Jane,
for lack of a better place to live, moved into an apartment
already occupied by Irma. Marie Wilson, a motion picture
and stage actress farnous for "dumb-blonde" roles, plays the
part of Irma.
,Jane, the more intelligent of the two, acts as narrator, introducing a series of ineidents in which Irma's stupidity creates
situations extremely embarrassing to one or both girls. Jane,
however, is totally incapable of coping with the dilemmas
posed by Irma's antics. With helpless fascination, Jane
watches the unfolding of each new near-catastrophe. Inevitably, in the most improbable and unexpected manner, each
situation turns out for the benefit of all concerned.
Irma is a confirmed ''one-man girl.'' Her boy friend, Al,
a smooth talking phony, is the third principal character in the
show. Al, with his schemes, frequently does as much or more
than Irma to create the uncomfortable situations to which
the characters are subjected. Jane also is a "one-man girl,"
very much in love with her socialite businessman employer,
Richard Rhinelander III. Richard is frequently the baffled
victim of Irma's stupidity and Al 's machinations. Minor
characters include an avarieious landlady, a burlesque violinist, Riehard 's mother, and a suceession of startlingly unconventional neighboring tenants and friends of AI.
Kurlan contends that his complaint tenders issues of faet
with respeet to aecess, originality, similarity and copying and
that the trial court erred in deciding these issues upon demurrer. He further claims that each count of his complaint
is well pleadrd and that the trial court erred in sustaining the
demurrers without leave to amend. The 1947 "procedural"
amendment to section 426 (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure,
he says, was not intended to prevent jury trials upon the
merits and did not change the ''substantive'' rule of law that
issues of faet shall not be determined upon demurrer or motion.
Another point urged by Kurlan is that the first four counts
of his complaint, based upon express and implied contract,
state causes of action which cannot be governed by the prineiples applicable to the tort action of plagiarism. As to the
fifth count, he declares that the cause of action will lie for
deliberate taking of his idea and format although no literary
property is involved.
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The defendants contend that, under section 426 ( 3), upon
demurrer, the court must examine the alleged infringed and
infringing productions and determine whether Kurian's production is legally protectible property and whether there is
any substantial evidence of similarity with respect to such
property. In determining the issue of originality, they argue,
the court should apply the doctrine of judicial notice. They
also contend that the complaint shows upon its face that the
literary content of Kurian's program previously has been
published and is, therefore, a part of the public domain.
Because no legally protectible material was used by them,
they say, the demurrers to each cause of action were properly
sustained. In addition, as to the counts upon express and
implied-in-fact contract, the defendants assert that the alleged
agreement is within the statute of frauds and unenforceable.
The preliminary question here, as in W eitzenkorn v. Lesser,
supra, is : To what actions does section 426 ( 3) of the Code
of Civil Procedure apply~ Kurian's counsel does not raise this
point in his briefs. However, it appears from the record that
the order requiring compliance with section 426 (3) was
entered over his objection and after argument concerning the
question. The general rule is "that ordinarily where a party
has neglected to present a point in his brief he may be precluded from insisting that the court consider the point when
deciding the case . . . . However, we know of no hard-and-fast
rule which prohibits the court from considering and deciding
points of law which may not have been urged and argued in
the briefs originally filed if it appears to the court that an
important legal principle is necessarily involved in the newly
discovered point and that a proper disposition of the case
requires a discussion and decision of that point." (Schubert
v. Lowe, 193 Cal. 291, 294 [223 P. 550]; Philbrook v. Randall,
195 Cal. 95, 105 [231 P. 739] .)
In W eitzenkorn v. Lesser, supra, it is held that the statute
applies not only to a tort action for plagiarism but also to
causes of action for infringement of related contract rights.
Therefore, the order of the trial court making the records of
both radio programs a part of the complaint affects all five
alleged causes of action and a comparison of the productions
must be made in considering each count.
Kurian contends that the statute cannot and does not deprive him of his right to a jury trial of issues of fact with
respect to access, originality, similarity and copying. As
held in W eitzenkorn v. Lesser, supra, the statute provides a
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method for considering the alleged infringed and infringing
productions upon demurrer. This in no way deprives a plaintiff of his right to a jury trial. If, from a comparison of the
productions, a question of fact is shown to exist, the cause
should be submitted to the jury.
· The defendants argue that the court may take judicial
notice of the contents of published books and playc;; and of
former and contemporary radio programs in determining
whether Kurian's claim of originality is well founded. For the
reasons stated in the W eitzenkorn case, the court cannot do so.
However, Kurland has alleged facts which negative originality as to the major portion of his production. He states that
"My Sister Eileen" featuring the characters "Ruth" and
''Eileen'' and ''depicting unique characterizations and relationships between said characters'' was originated, created and
written by Ruth McKenney for the "New Yorker Magazine."
The audition recording which Kurian has attached to his complaint also states that the story has been published in books .
.According to the recording, "Millions of people have read the
Ruth and Eileen stories.''
.At the time Kurian's cause of action arose, section 983 of
the Civil Code declared: ''If the owner of a product of the
mind intentionally makes it public, a copy or reproduction
may be made public by any person, without responsibility
to the owner, so far as the law of this state is concerned.''
Section 980 of the same code, as then in effect, provided that,
''The author of any product of the mind, . . . has an exclusive
ownership therein, and in the representation or expression
thereof, which continues so long as the product and the representations or expressions thereof made by him remain in his
possession.·''
Kurian's complaint shows that any property interest which
McKenney may have had in either the story or characters of
''My Sister Eileen'' has been lost by publication. .According
to the pleader, neither the product of McKenney's mind nor
its representations or expressions remain in her possession.
Therefore, as a matter of law, there is no protectible property in the "basic dramatic core" of the story, its characters
and their relationships, or the form and manner of its expression.
It is suggested, however, that McKenney retained the right
to use the characters "Ruth" and "Eileen" in sequels to the
original stories. The implication is that no one else could
acquire this right. But even if we assume that characteriza-
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tions may be protectible, these characters' were products of the
mind which intentionally had been made public. Under the
circumstances, there was nothing to prevent McKenney or
anyone else from utilizing them in other productions.
The program incorporated in the complaint declares that it
features'' the further adventures of Ruth and Eileen.'' Therefore, we must assume for the purposes of the demurrers that
the story is a sequel to, and not a reproduction of, McKenney's
literary creation, which is not before the court and the contents of which we cannot judicially notice. Even though the
dramatic core of Kurian's production, together with its two
principal characters, their relationships, and its locale, are
unoriginal under the allegations of the pleading, neither its
style and manner of expression nor its minor characters can
be held, upon demurrer, to lack originality as a matter of
law. (Weitzenkorn v. Lesser, supra.)
In addition to his allegation that he created an ''original
untitled radio program," Kurian claims to have "devised a
new and original radio program idea" for which he "originated, created and devised . . . new program techniques and
methods of radio presentation . . . including a new radio
production format.'' In that regard, this case is similar to
Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 35 Cal.2d 653
[221 P.2d 73, 23 A.L.R.2d 216], and Kovacs v. Mutual Broadcast1:ng System, Inc., 99 Cal.App.2d 56 [221 P.2d 108], where
the claimed protectible property was a "radio program idea"
rather than the traditional conception of ''literary property.''
Under the rules stated and applied in deciding those cases,
for Kurian to have a protectible interest in his radio program
idea as reduced to a production format, he must establish
both originality and novelty.
Kurian's radio program idea was to capitalize upon a famous
and successful story, play and motion picture by producing
it on the radio. The court may take judicial notice of thr
fact that there is nothing new and novel in this idea which
might constitute protectible property. (Stanley v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc., supra, p. 663.) Whether there is
any originality or novelty in Kurian's "new program techniques and methods of radio presentation'' is more difficult
to determine. There is nothing novel about customary broadcasting techniques, but the court cannot have judicial knowledge of all of the methods of the highly complicated radio industry. It might be possible for Kurian to show that he created something novel in the way of program techniques and
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methods of presentation. Because extrinic evidence is required
to prove whether thflre is any element of novelty in his program techniques, it cannot be determinfld upon demurrer,
that there is no protectible property in them. Insofar as the
question of a lack of originality or novelty may be involved
in each cause of action, the demurrers could not properly have
been sustained solely upon that ground.
The next question for decision is that of similarity. Access
and inclination to copy being admitted by the demurrer, then
if it may be said that some substantial similarity between
the programs reasonably could be found, the issues of
similarity and of copying are to be determined by the trier
of fact. Having both programs before it upon demurrer
in accordance with section 426(3), the court may determine
whether there is substantial similarity between them. ( W eitze·nkorn v. Lesser, snprn.) If, as a matter of law, there is no
such similarity, then there is no question of fact and the
demurrers to each count of the complaint were properly
sustained.
In order for the fifth count of the complaint to state a
cause of action for plagiarism, there must be some substantial similarity between the defendants' radio program and
protectible portions of Kurian's production. ( W eitzenkorn y
Lesser, supm.) Even if it might be found that there is some
originality in the development of minor characters which
Kurian may have added to McKenney's story for the purposes
of the radio program, there is no similarity between them and
characters in the defendants' program. Nor is there any similarity between the two shows as to the form and manner of
expression of their literary content. However, some similarity
might be found in the methods of program presentation and
radio techniques. Because evidence may tend to prove that
Kurian's program format was both original and novel, the
demurrers to the fifth cause of action were improperly sustained.
'l'he defendants strike directly at the heart of Kurian's other
claims by asserting that the complaint charges only the breach
of an express, or an implied-in-fact, contract to pay for a
''new and original'' radio program, if used. They argue that,
both from the allegations of the complaint and from the
audition program itself, it appears, as a matter of law, that
the program is neither original nor novel. Therefore, they
say, no cause of action is stated upon an express or impliedin-fact contract.
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However, as previously stated, it cannot be determined
upon demurrer in the absence of evidence of previously published works that there is nothing original in the literary
content of the program or that the radio production techniques
utilized lack novelty. Nor may the complaint be construed
so narrowly as suggested. by the defendants. In substance, it
alleges that Kurian created a new and original radio program
which he submitted to the defendants in return for their
promise, express or implied, to pay ''the reasonable value
thereof" if they used it. Although Kurian has described his
production as a new and original program, he does not allege
that he represented it to the defendants as such. Also, there is
no allegation that the agreement was conditioned upon KurIan's production's being new and original. The pleading allows
Kurian to present evidence, if there be such, tending to prove
a promise, express or implied in fact, to pay for the use of
his program whether or not it is original.
For this reason, and in accordance with the rule stated in
W eitzenkorn v. Lesser, supra, the question of protectibility
need not be considered in determining the sufficiency of the
allegations of the first count of the complaint, based upon
express contract. Kurian may be able to present evidence
showing some similarity between the program techniques.
In addition, although there is no similarity between protectible portions of the literary content of Kurian's program and
the defendants' broadcasts, there is the possibility of finding
some similarity in the use by each production of a ''dumb''
character who produces difficult situations for a "smart"
character, both being girls who share an apartment in New
York City. The terms of the contract and the content of the
programs present questions of fact for the jury as to the
contractual provisions, access, similarity, and copying.
However, the defendants argue that, even if the cause of
action upon express contract otherwise is well pleaded, the
demurrers to it properly were sustained because the complaint shows on its face that the contract is within the bar
of the statute of frauds. Even if it be assumed that the
transaction alleged might be said to be a sale of "goods"
within section 1624a of the Civil Code, the complaint, upon
its face, does not show the bar of the statute. A transaction
is removed from the statute by acceptance of part of the goods
received. "There is an acceptance of goods . . . when the
buyer, either before or after delivery of the goods, expresses
by words or conduct his assent to becoming the owner of those
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specific goods." (§ 1624a[3].) Kurian alleges facts from
which access, copying and use conceivably could be found.
If such findings were made, acceptance of at least a portion
of the goods received would be proved and the statute would
constitute no bar to the action. [lb] Under the circumstances,
the facts pleaded in the first count are sufficient to state a cause
of action and the demurrers thereto were improperly sustained.
[2b, 3b] The second and third counts of the complaint are
based upon the common count of quantum valebant and are
sufficient to state a cause of action upon either a contract implied in fact or one implied in law. (Weitzenkorn v. Lesser,
supra.) As stated in theWeitzenkorn case, ''Although it is unnecessary for the pleading to distinguish between the contract
implied in fact and the contract implied in law, or quasi contract, the elements which must be proved for recovery upon
each of them are quite different.'' Here, it might be possible
for Kurian to recover upon either a contract implied in fact or
one implied in law. Under the first theory, the required proof
is essentially the same as that for the count upon express contract, with the exception that conduct, rather than words of
promise, must be proved from which the promise may be implied. On the other hand, if Kurian relies upon a contract
implied in law, the proof necessary for a recovery is the same
as that required by the tort action for plagiarism. For these
reasons, the demurrers to the second and third counts of the
complaint should have been overruled.
[4b] The fourth count relies upon a contract implied in
fact from trade customs, practices and usages. The conclusions
in regard to the count upon express contract are equally
applicable to this count and the demurrers thereto were improperly sustained.
These conclusions make it unnecessary to consider Kurian's
contention that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court
to have sustained the general demurrers to all five causes of
action without leave to amend.
The judgment is reversed as to each cause of action with
directions to permit the defendants to answer.
Gibson, C. J., and Shenk, J., concurred.
SCHAUER, ,J.-I concur in the judgment and with all that
portion of the opinion which is not inconsistent with the views
expressed by me in Golding v. R.K.O. Pictures, Inc. (1950),
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:35 Cal.2d 690, 710 [221 P.2d 95] ; in Stanley v. Ool1~rnbia
Systern, In,c. (1950), 35 Cal.2d 653, 668 [221
P.2d 73, 23 A.L.R.2d 216] ; and in Burtis v. Universal Pictures Co., Inc., post, p. 823 [256 P.2d 933].

Broadc~asting

TRAYNOR, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-Plaintiff seeks
recovery for the alleged unauthorized use of his plan for a
radio program to consist in the serialized presentation of the
adventures of two sisters living in a New York apartment.
He reduced his plan to concrete form by preparing a script
and audition of one Rample program and submitted it to defendants. He allegeR that they made use of his program
by producing "My Friend Irma," and that either under the
terms of an express or implied contract, or by virtue of piracy
of his literary property, he is entitled to recover damages for
such use. The majority opinion holds that he has stated causes
of action both for breach of contract and for plagiarism.
Since in my opinion plaintiff has not alleged facts, which if
proved, would establish infringement of his literary property,
I cannot agree with the latter holding.
Plaintiff's program may be divided into three elements.
'l'here is the raw material consisting of the two principal
characters, the basic relationship between them, and the locale
of their adventures. . Since this material was taken from the
published works of Ruth McKenney, it could in no event constitute protectible literary property under the law of this state.
( Civ. Code, § 983.) Accordingly, it is unnecessary to decide
whether it constituted merely some of the basic ideas embodied
in the program, or would, had it not been previously published,
eonstitute a sufficient development and treatment of basic
ideas to be the subject of copyright protection. (See Golding
Y. R.K.O. Pictures, Inc., 35 Cal.2d 690, 701 [221 P.2d 95],
diso;ent, and cases and authorities there cited.)
Using McKenney's material, plaintiff produced his sample
program in which he presented one adventure of the two
:-;isters. Although he cannot claim copyright protection under
the law of this state for McKenney's material or for the ideas
he may have added to it, he is entitled to protection for any
original treatment and development he has given to such
material and ideas. I agree with the holding of the court,
however, that insofar as the dramatic content of the sample
program is concerned, there is no similarity between plaintiff's
original contributions and defendants' program. Such similarity as does exist in this respect arises only from the common
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nse of thr basie drarnati<~ sitnation found in the MeKenney
works, and aeeordingly, will not support a finding of piracy.
(Golding v. R.K.O. P1~cturcs, Inc., 35 Ca1.2d 690, 695-696
l221 P.2d 95].)
rrhe third element of plaintiff's program is its basic plan as
<listinet from the specific episode or adventure presented as a
sample or illustration thereof. 'l'he plan or format consists
of a eombination of the following ideas : the use of the McKenney material as the basis for a serialized radio program;
the use of first person narration by the intelligent sister to set
the stage and bridge the gaps between the scenes in each
program; and the use of the principal characters to carry over
listener interest from week to week. It may be assumed that
this combination of ideas was original with plaintiff. Moreover, although there is nothing new or novel about any one of
these ideas, it may be assumed that they had not been combined in the same manner in any earlier radio program. It
does not follow, however, that this combination of ideas constitutes protectible intellectual property. The basic program
plan adopted as the foundation for a radio serial is analogous
to the basic dramatic core or plot of a play or movie. It
consists only of the author's general ideas as distinct from his
original treatment or development of them. Such general ideas
are free and cannot constitute property. (See Golding v.
R.K.O. Pictures, Inc., 35 Cal.2d 690, 701 [221 P.2d 95],
dissent; Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 35
Cal.2d 653, 672 [221 P.2d 73, 23 A.L.R.2d 216], dissent.)
In W eitzenkorn v. Lesser, ante, p. 778 [256 P.2d 947],
the court holds that since the 1947 amendment to Civil Code,
section 980, ideas, as distinct from the original form and
manner of their expression, do not constitute literary property
in this state. It justifies the protection against plagiarism
that was given to the basic dramatic core of plaintiffs' play
in Golding v. R.K.O. Pictures, Inc., 35 Oal.2d 690 [221 P.2d
95], and to the radio program idea in Stanley v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc., 35 Oal.2d 653 [221 P.2d 73, 23
A.L.R.2d 216), on the ground that 'rin its earlier form, the
statute expressly protected both the idea, the 'product of the
mind,' and 'the representation or expression thereof.' " Since
in the present case the cause of action arose before the statute
was amended, the court follows the Stanley and Golding
cases in treating plaintiff's radio program idea as protectible
literary property.
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As it was originally enacted, Civil Code, section 980 1 , referred generally to ''any product of the mind,'' and then
listed the different types of intellectual property that might
exist. Among those listed was ''a composition in letters or
art,'' and protection was extended not only to the product
itself, that is, to the composition in letters or art, but also
to any representation or expression thereof. Thus protection
was not limited to the exact literary composition created by
the author, but extended to other and different representations and expressions that might be copied therefrom. Under
its terms, however, the protection existed only so long ''as the
product and the representation or expression thereof" remained in the author's possession. It was thus arguable that
the common law copyrights in a literary composition might
be lost by a transfer of possession of the manuscript even without actual publication.
In 1947 the statute was amended to deal specifically with
compositions in letters or art, 2 and the provisions relating
to other forms of intellectual property and the limitation
with respect to possession were deleted. 3 Thus the amendment made clear that the author's common law copyrights in
a composition in letters or art are not dependent upon possession of the composition or its expression or representation,
but are only lost in the event of publication as provided in
section 983 of the Civil Code. The statute now deals expressly
with copyrights as distinct from rights of possession or ownership of the original manuscript itself. ( Cf., Civ. Code, § 985.)
Neither before nor after its 1947 amendment, however, did
section 980 purport to define the extent to which property
rights might exist in orig·inal ideas as distinct from their
treatment and development. An expression or representation
of an original composition might consist only in the statement
of the general outline of the dramatic core or plot of a play
or movie, or in the statement of a general plan for a radio
1
' ' The author of any product of the mind, whether it is an invention,
or a composition in letters or art, or a design, with or without delineation,
or other graphical representation, has an exclusive ownership therein,
and in the representation or expression thereof, which continues so long
as the product and the representations or expressions thereof made by
him remain in his possession.' '
2
' ' The author or proprietor of any composition in letters or art has an
exclusive ownership in the representation or expression thereof as against
all persons except one who originally and independently creates the same
or a similar composition.''
3
A separate subdivision dealing with other forms of intellectual property was added to section 980 in 1949. (Stats. 1949, ch. 921, § 1.)
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program. (Golding v. R.K.O. Pictures, Inc., s~tpra; Stanley
v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., supra.) Thus, if
the Golding and Stanley cases were correctly decided, protection could be extended to the basic dramatic core of a play
or the plan of a radio program under the present statute just
as it was in those cases under the former.
In my opinion, however, the court properly accepted the
concession of the parties in the Stanley case that sections
980 and 983, as formerly worded, were but codifications of the
common law. The 1947 amendments to those sections, which
antedated the decisions in the Stanley and Golding cases,
merely clarified this fact by eliminating the language that
might have been interpreted as making the duration of common
law copyrights turn on possession rather than publication.
Accordingly, the common law rule that ideas are not property,
which the court now recognizes (Weitzenkorn v. Lesser, ante,
p. 778 [256 P.2d 947]), should be applied in this case by
holding that plaintiff has not stated a cause of action for
plagiarism.
From a comparison of the two programs it cannot be said
as a matter of law that defendants have not used plaintiff's
radio program idea. Although that idea is not property, it
may be protected by an express or an implied-in-fact contract. (Weitzenkorn v. Lesser, ante, p. 778 [256 P.2d 947];
Stanley v. Col1£mbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 35 Cal.2d
653, 674 [221 P.2d 73, 23 A.L.R.2d 216]; dissent.) Since
plaintiff has pleaded counts in both express and implied-infact contract, I concur in the judgment to the extent that it
reverses the order sustaining the demurrer to those counts.
Spence, J., concurred.
CARTER, ,T.--I dissent.
I concur in the reversal of the judgment but I cannot
concur in the greater part of the reasoning and law propounded in the majority opinion.
It is stated by the majority that "Kurian's complaint shows
that any property interest which McKenney may have had in
either the story or characters of 'My Sister Eileen' has been
lost by publication.'' The pleading shows that the story and
characters were made public in a play, picture, magazines
and books. It also shows that the stories had never been
presented on the air and that by written agreement plaintiff's
assignor had expressly reserved the sole and exclusive right
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to use for radio broadcasting purposes these leading female
characters. ''The owner of the common-law copyright bas a
perpetual right of property and the exclusive right of first
general publication, and may, prior thereto, enjoy the benefit
of a restricted publication without forfeiture of the right of
general publication. Thus, he may communicate the contents
of his work under restrictions without forfeiture of the right.
This communication of contents under re,striction, is known
as a restricted or limited publication." (Emphasis added;
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 147 F. 15, 18.) "A limited publication of a subject of copyright is one which communicates
a knowledge of its contents under conditions expressly or impliedly precluding its dedication to the public. Abernethy v.
Hutchinson, 3 L.J.Ch. 209; Nichols v. Pitman, 26 L.R.Ch.Div.
374; Caird v. Sime, 12 L.R.App.Cas. 326; Tomkins v.
Halleck, 133 Mass. 32, 43 Am.Rep. 480; Palmer v. De Witt,
47 N.Y. 532, 7 Am.Rep. 480; Turner v. Robinson, 10 Ir.Ch.
Uep. 121, 135; Laura Keene v. Wheatley & Clarke, 9 Am.Law
Reg. 33-80, Fed. Cas. No. 7,644." (W erckmeister v. American
Lithographic Co., 134 F. 321 [69 C.C.A. 553, 68 L.R.A. 591];
Amdur, Copyright Law and Practice, pp. 354-356.)
"It is well settled that the public performance of a dramatic
or musical composition is merely a limited publication which
does not confer upon the hearer or spectator any title to the
manuscript, or any right to a copy which may have been obtained surreptitiously, or which may have come into his possession accidentally; because only a publication of the manuscript will amount to an abandonment of the rights of the
author and a consequent transfer of them to the public domain,
and no s1wh publication occurs as long as the author exercises
control over his manuscript, or has a right to such control.
( Ct·owe v. Aiken, Fed. Cas. 3441; Koene v. Clark, 5 Robertson
(28 N.Y. Super. Ct.) 38; Keene v. Kimball, 16 Gray (Mass.)
G45, 77 Am.Dec. 426; Bmwn v. Perris, 122 Misc. 418, 204
N.Y.S. 190.) Consequently a special public use of it by the
author for his own benefit is no evidence of abandonment of
his property therein, because such a use is entirely consistent
with his exclusive right to its control. Thus, the reading,
recital or stage representation of a manuscript play in public
for profit, with the consent of the author, does not constitute
any evidence of abandonment to the public of any rights
arising from the authorship of the play; nor does it deprive
him of his right to copyright the play. (Boucicault v. Fox,
3 Fed.Cas. 977.)
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''A ticket of admission merely entitles the holder to witness and enjoy a single exhibition of the play, without conferring upon any member of the public the right to obtain
surreptitiously the possession of the original manuscript for
subsequent representation for profit, or to reproduce the
eomposition from memory or from notes taken during the
performance, in order to share in the earnings of its public
presentation. If the atdhor of a play were not entitled to
claim the protection of the law to secure to him the profits
resulting from public performances of his composition, dramatists would soon cease to write plays for the amtrsement and
entedainment of the public, unless subsidized by government
or aided by private patronage: for the revenue derived from
the sale of published copies of a popular drama would be
negligible in comparison with the box-office receipts. ( W erckmeister v. American Litho. Co., 134 F. 321 [69 C.C.A. 553,
68 I.J.R.A. 591] .)
''~Where an uncopyrighted and unprinted drama has been
publicly performed at a theatre with the author's consent,
no unlicensed person has a right to repeat the performance
in a public theatre, or to publish copies of the dramatic composition, whether obtained surreptitiously or reproduced from
memory after witnessing a performance thereof; for the
a11thor's permission to act it at a public theatre does not
runount to an abandonment of his title to it or to a dedication of it to the public; and the proprietor of the exclusive
performing rights, or his assignee, by virtue of his common
law r'ights, is ent1:tled to an 1"njtrnction restraining an unanthorized representation thereof. (Ferris v. Frohman, 223
U.S. 424 [32 S.Ct. 263, 56 L.Ed. 492].)
''Where the intent of the owner is to give the public merely
a right to a limited use of his literary property or to use it
in a particular way, the owner'R act does not constitute an
abandonment of all hiR property; hut the public acquires a
right to usc t"t only to the extent of the dedication. (Aronson
v. Baker, 43 N .•T.Eq. 365, 12 A. 177.)" (Ball, Law of Copyright and Literary Property, 1944, § 61, p. 135.) (EmphasiR
added.)
It is common practice to reserve the dramatizing rights
on the Rale of a book and these rights are respected and upheld by the courtR (Ford v. Charles E. Blaney Amusement
Co., 148 :F'. 642). Section 1 (b) of the 1909 Copyright Act
expressly confers upon the copyright proprietor the exclusive
right to transform the work by translation, dramatization,

818

KuRLAN v. CoLUMBIA BRoADCASTING SYSTEM [ 40 C.2d

adaptation, and by making other versions embodying material
and substantial parts of the original in order to enable the
author to reap the profits of his work in every field of intellectual property in which it can be exploited advantageously by vending copies or by public performance for profit
(O'Neill v. General Film Co., 157 N.Y.S. 1028). This section
has been literally construed by the courts to cover any adaptation of a literary work which tells the same story as the
original, whether the resulting drama be adapted for presentation in the form of a stage play or for exhibition on the
screen (Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros, 222 U.S. 55 [56 L.Ed. 92,
Ann.Cas. 1913A 1285] ; International Film S. Co. v. Affil1·atcd Distributors, 283 F. 229).
For the purpose of the demurrer, all allegations of the
complaint must be taken as true. It is alleged in the complaint
here that on or about the 11th day of March, 1946, Ruth
McKenney and plaintiff entered into an agreement in writing,
wherein Ruth McKenney did grant to plaintiff the sole and
exclusive right to use for radio broadcasting purposes the
leading female characters created by her and featured or
portrayed in ''said stories, stage play and motion picture
entitled 'lJ!I y Sister Eileen,' and said Ruth McKenney did
furthermore grant to said plaintiff Arthur Kurian all radio
broadcasting rights therein and thereto which had theretofore
been expr·essly reserved by said R1tth McKenney in connection with each and all of said prior licenses and uses of said
r:hamcters in connection with said stories, play and motion
picture hereinbefore mentioned." (Emphasis added.) It is
further alleged that after the expiration of the original term
of the agreement the time was extended by the parties, Ruth
McKenney and plaintiff; that Ruth McKenney reserved and
retained the right to receive royalties in connection with the
production of any and all radio programs licensed under the
agreement. Hence, plaintiff's assignor reserved all radio
rights in the two leading characters, and it cannot be true,
as is stated in the majority opinion, that ''as a matter of law,
there is no protectible property in the 'basic dramatic core'
of the story, its characters and their relationships, or the form
and manner of its expression" because there has been a publication. The allegations of the complaint show that the
publication was a limited one with certain rights reserved.
It has been recognized that different types of rights may
be reserved in literary works and that publication may be restricted so as to preserve those rights. (See Manners v. Famous
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Players-Lasky Corp., 262 ]'. 811; L. C. Page & Co. v. Fo:r
Film Corp., 83 F.2d 196; Gogniat v. Universal Pictures Corp.,
35 U.S. Pat.Q. 117; Cas'ino Productions v. Vitaphone Corp.,
163 Misc. 403 [295 N.Y.S. 501]; Society of European S.A.A.C.
v. New York Hotel Statler Co., 19 F.Supp. 1; Gillette v. Stoll
li'ilm Co., 120 Misc. 850 [200 N.Y.S. 787] ; Benelli v. Hopkins,
198 Misc. 734 [103 N.Y.S.2d 526] ; G. Ricordi & Co., v. Paramount Pictures, 189 F.2d 469, cert.den. 342 U.S. 849 [72 S.Ct.
77, 96 L.Ed. 641] .)
At the time Kurian's cause of action arose, § 980 of the
Civil Code provided protection for ''any product of the mind
. . . and in the representation or expression thereof.'' (Emphasis added.) The majority says, however, that the two
leading characters involved were unoriginal and unworthy of
protection inasmuch as any property right in them had been
lost by publication. As I have heretofore stated, it is my
opinion that the publication was a limited one, with the radio
rights expressly reserved and that there was a protectible
property interest involved. The statute reads, for our purposes,
as it did when this court decided Golding v. R.K.O. Pictures,
Inc., 35 Cal.2d 690 [221 P.2c1 95 J, wherein a basic, dramatic
core with one important dramatic figure was held to constitute
a protectible interest.
Characters and characterizations which are products of the
mind should be held to be protectible property interests. The
radio industry is a large one, and radio programs are frequently based upon a single character, personality or characterization. To illustrate the extremely valuable theatricalradio properties which are in existence one only must look
as far as the radio column in his daily paper to note the
programs, built around a single character, or family, which
continue from day to day, week to week, and year to year.* It
should be apparent to even the least intelligent that these
programs are as valuable as the most gilt-edged security listed
on the Stock Exchange. No court would hesitate to extend its
protection to the lawful owner of a security, and yet equally
*Sherlock Holmes; The Thin Man; The Fat Man; Michael Shane;
Count of Monte Cristo; Crime Doctor; The Whistler; Mr. District Attorney; A Date with Judy; Adventures of Bulldog Drummond; Adventures of Ellery Queen; Adventures of the Falcon; Jack Armstrong;
Blondie; Captain Midnight; The Lone Ranger; Stella Dallas; Ma
Perkins; The Great Gildersleeve; Perry Mason; Superman; Young Dr.
Malone; The Cisco Kid; Fibber McGee and Molly; Mr. and Mrs. North;
One Man's Family; The Aldrich Family; Amos 'n' Andy; Edgar Bergen
and Charlie McCarthy; Burns and Allen; and many others.
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valuable ''character-types'' are not given the same protection.
It is surely a subject of jud ieial notiee that California is the
center of the motion picture industry of the world and if its
laws are inadequate for the protection of the individual creative writer who must find a market for his work, then those
laws should be amended. It is axiomatic that the movie industry could not exist without the writer and yet, if the present
trend continues, the writer will vanish from the scene. 'l'he
same is true of the radio industry. A writer submits his work
to either industry in the hope and rightful expectation that
if his work is used, he will be paid its value, but, under presently existing conditions, and court decisions, these industries
may make minor changes in the play, or manuscript, and
escape liability and any obligation to pay any consideration
therefor. As Goldsmith wrote (Enquiry into the Present
State of Polite Learning) as an epitaph to the memory of his
friend, Ned Purdon, an author:
''Here lies poor Ned Purdon, from misery freed,
vVho long was a bookseller's hack;
He led such a damnable life in this world,
I don't think he'll wish to come back!''
The statement attributed to Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 35 Cal.2d 653 [221 P.2d 73, 23 A.L.R.2d
216], found in the majority opinion here is misleading so far
as this case is concerned. That statement is ''Kurian's radio
prog-ram idea was to capitalize upon a famous and successful
story, play and motion picture by producing it on the radio.
The court may take judicial notice of the fact that there is
nothing new and novel in this idea which might constitute
protectible property." We said there that there was "nothing
new in a play broadcast over the air.'' There is nothing new
in a play broadcast over the air, but there is something new
in a play broadcast by someone else over the air for the first
time if the author of that play has reserved the radio rights
thereto, because the play is being used in a medium new to it.
'rhe Stanley case was not concerned with the broadcasting
rights in a play; it was concerned with a combination of ideas
which was being used for the first time in a certain way and
the originator of that combination of ideas, with the permission of the author of the new play, was suing the broadcasting
system.
Section 426 ( 3) of the Code of Civil Procedure now provides that the copy of the production as to which the infringement is claimed and a copy of the alleged infringing produc-
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tion must be attached to the complaint. This permits the trial
court, upon demurrer, to decide in the first instance whether
or not there is similarity between the two productions. Heretofore, the question of similarity has been considered to be one
of fact (Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 35
Cal.2d 653 [221 P.2d 73, 23 A.L.R.2d 216] ; Golding v. R.K.O.
Pictures, Inc., 35 Cal.2d 690 [221 P.2d 95] ; Kovacs v. Mutual
Broadcasting System, Inc., 99 Cal.App.2d 56 [221 P.2d 108];
Fmnkel v. Irwin, 34 F.2d 142; Twentieth Century-Fox Film
Corp. v. Dieckhaus, 153 F.2d 893), and the test to be that
impression received by the average reasonable man upon a
comparative reading of the two works. There should be no
change in the test to be used under the new code section. It
should still be that of the reasonable man. In other words,
if reasonable minds could differ as to whether or not there is
simila,rity between the two works, then the question is still one
of fact for the jury.
In the play "My Sister Eileen," Ruth, as narrator, is a
young, attractive, intelligent working girl who is the unwilling
victim of a succession of difficulties created by her sister,
Eileen, with whom she lives because "apartments are hard to
find in New York." Ruth is the balancewheel for her completely thoughtless, impulsive, scatterbrained sister, Eileen.
Eileen is hopelessly unable to hold a job and has had six of
them within four months. She has no financial sense and never
has any money because she spends every cent she has on
"junk" which everybody seems to be able to sell her. She
nses the common exchequer and family funds without Ruth's
knowledge or consent and makes life unbearable for Ruth with
her scatterbrained schemes ; embarrasses Ruth by ridiculous
lies told without malice or intent to creat mischief but with
rvery desire to help her sister and roommate. Ruth and
Eileen are from Ohio. Ruth has acquired some city "sophistiration" while Eileen has nat and remains completely naive.
Rnth's supposed fiance, Claude, is described as a blustering
"braggart," but she is in love with a serious, intelligent businessman, Lloyd Carter.
Jane, in the radio production "My Friend Irma," as narrator, is a serious, intelligent working girl from Wyoming who
has aequired a certain amount of city ''sophistication.'' She
lives with her "friend Irma" because apartments are "hard
to find these days.'' Jane is in love with a serious, intelligent
businessman, Richard Rhinelander III. Irma is gay, careless,
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impulsive, thoughtless and completely lacking in sophistication ; she causes Jane endless difficulties because of her scatterbrained schemes. Irma's boy friend, AI, is described as a
"phony windbag." In this program, as in the play "My
Sister Eileen" there is an eccentric landlady.
In conjunction with the similarities just set forth, attention
is called to the summary of the two productions as set forth in
the majority opinion. It cannot be said, as a matter of law,
that there is no similarity between the two. The briefs show
that in describing the radio program entitled "My Friend
Irma," the New York Herald-Tribune, on March 22, 1948,
stated in a dramatic criticism and review of the program:
''The centr·al idea, that of two young girl roommates, one
bright, the other one almost intolerably innocent of all knowledge, was taken almost intact from a very funny play entitled
'My Sister Eileen.'" (Emphasis added.) The question of
similarity between the two productions is most assuredly one
on which reasonable minds might differ as can be seen from
the above quoted dramatic review and the fact that three
justices of the District Court of Appeal (see (Cal.App.) 233
P .2d 936) as well as myself feel that within the common
knowledge of the average reader, observer, spectator or listener
there are sufficient similarities to induce the belief that copying
has taken place. It is true that there are differences between
the two programs, but as Mr. Justice Edmonds said in the
Golding case ''such differences go to the quality of the plagiarism, and not to its existence or nonexistence." ( Goldirng v.
R.K.O. P1:ct1u·es, Inc., 35 Cal.2d 690, 699 [221 P.2d 95] .)
No test other than the reasonable minds one has ever been
laid down for determining the question of similarity between
the alleged infringed and infringing productions and there
is no reason why, in determining the matter upon a demurrer,
the trial court should apply any other rule. As I read the
majority opinion in this case and in that of W eitzenkorn v.
Lesser, ante, p. 778 [256 P.2d' 947] (this day filed) I do
not find that any test has been proposed other than that of
"substantial similarity." In W eitzenkorn v. Lesser, supra, it
is said ''if some substantial similarity between the compositions reasonably could be found, the issues of similarity and
of copying are to be determined by the trier of the fact'' and
in the instant case it is said that "If, from a comparison of
the productions, a question of fact is shown to exist, the cause
should be submitted to the jury.'' In my opinion, these statements are not the equivalent of saying that the question is
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one for the jury if reasonable minds could differ one whether
or not the two prodnctions are similar.
I would reverse the judgment with directions to the trial
court to overrule the demurrer as to all counts and permit defendants to answer if they be so advised.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied May 28,
1953. Carter, J., and Spence, J., were of the opinion that
the petition should be granted.
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THOMSON BUR'fiS, Respondent. v. UNIVERSAI.J PICTURES COMPANY, INC. (a Corporation) et al., Appellants.
[1] Literary Property-Evidence.-In action for unauthorized use
of literary property, a judgment for plaintiff is not sustained
by evidence that he first wrote an outline synopsis designed
for development into a motion picture script, which was submitted to defendant motion picture company; that on the
basis of this synopsis plaintiff and defendant entered into
an agreement under which plaintiff was to complete an original story suitable for a motion picture and defendant was
granted an option to purchase the story for a designated sum;
that the story, on its completion, was delivered to defendant,
which did not exercise the option and which retained both
the synopsis and the story; and that defendant some years
later produced a picture based on the same basic theme, where
a comparison of the story and the motion picture shows no
similarity between them as to form and manner of expression.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Henry M. Willis, Judge. Reversed with
directions.
Action for damages for unauthorized use of literary property. Judgment for plaintiff reversed with directions.
[1] See Cal.Jur., Literary Property; Am.Jur., Literary Property and Copyright, § 66 et seq.
McK. Dig. Reference: [1] Literary Property.

